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Abstract
Most products are produced and sold by supply chain networks, where an in-
terconnected network of producers and intermediaries set prices to maximize their
profits. I show that there exists a unique equilibrium in a price-setting game on
a network. The key distortion reducing both total profits and social welfare is
multiple-marginalization, which is magnified by strategic interactions. Individual
profits are proportional to influentiality, which is a new measure of network central-
ity defined by the equilibrium characterization. The results emphasize the impor-
tance of the network structure when considering policy questions such as mergers
or trade tariffs.
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1 Introduction
Most products are produced and sold by supply chain networks, where an interconnected
network of producers, suppliers, and intermediaries choose prices to maximize their own
profits. Some firms in the network compete with other firms offering similar products or
services, some may be regulated, whereas others enjoy market power in their niche and
can affect the pricing of the final good.
For example, in the book publishing industry, a publisher purchases content from au-
thors, services from editors and marketing firms, and outsources printing to a printer, who
in turn purchases paper, ink, and other supplies from outside companies. The publisher is
typically also not selling books directly to consumers but has contracts with distributors,
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who in turn deal with wholesalers, retail chains, and individual retailers. Many of these
companies have some market power and earn positive rents. According to estimates in
the New York Times, from a typical $26 book, the retail side gets about half, printing
and transport costs are about 13%, and the author is generally paid about 15%, which
suggests that the markups to various parties play a major role.1
The main question of this paper is how are prices set on supply chain networks? In
the model, I allow the firms to have market power over their own products and influence
the pricing of other monopolists on a network of influences. The characterization needs
to overcome two difficulties. First, the demand function is typically non-linear, which
means that the optimality conditions are non-linear and therefore recursively solving for
best-response functions becomes analytically intractable with most networks. Second,
the decisions on the network are interconnected—when firms in different parts of the
network make decisions they may have different information and may influence different
firms. This means that the problem is dynamic but cannot be solved sequentially, i.e.
with backward induction. I overcome these problems by characterizing best-responses
by their inverses and aggregating all necessary conditions into one necessary condition
for equilibrium. I then show that this condition has a unique solution and the implied
behavior is indeed an equilibrium.
The main result of the paper is a characterization theorem. Under a few regular-
ity conditions, there exists a unique equilibrium. I provide full characterization for the
equilibrium and show how to compute it. The equilibrium condition has a natural inter-
pretation. It equalizes the difference between the equilibrium price of the final good and
the total marginal cost with a weighted sum of influences in all levels. The most basic
level of influence is how marginal price increase influences firms’ own profit directly and
there is one such influence for each firm. The second level of influence specifies how price
increase changes the behavior of firms directly influences by this change. But there are
also higher-level influences, as each price change if an influenced firm may have further
indirect influences on the behavior of other firms. All those levels of influences are weighed
with endogenous weights that are determined by the shape of the demand function and
the equilibrium behavior.
A natural question is how social welfare and total profits depend on the network struc-
ture? I show that the key distortion that reduces both profits and welfare is multiple-
marginalization. Marginalization problem is increasing in the number of firms and is
magnified by strategic interactions. The network structure plays a crucial role in deter-
mining the efficiency losses. The main takeaway from this is that policy analysis needs
to take into account how a particular regulation affects the underlying influences on the
supply chain network. For example, a merger can be seemingly efficiency-improving, but
if it leads to more influence by the merged firms, it may revert the conclusions about
efficiency. Similarly, trade restrictions and tariffs are often designed to change the supply
chains. To evaluate the impact of such policies, it is important to take into account their
impact on the network of influences.
Another natural question is who are the firms that are more powerful in the network
and how does this depend on the network structure? Many firms in the supply chain
1New York Times “Math of Publishing Meets the E-Book”, by Motoko Rich (Feb. 28, 2010), https:
//www.nytimes.com/2010/03/01/business/media/01ebooks.html.
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network have some market power and therefore earn positive profits. But intuitively,
firms that affect other firms are more powerful. Indeed, the equilibrium characterization
defines a natural measure of influentiality of each firm, which depends on how many
other firms the firm influences, but also how influential are the other firms that the firm
influences. The firms’ markups and profits are proportional to this measure. The measure
is a generalization of standard centrality measures, where the weights for the direct and
indirect influences are endogenously defined by the demand function. In some special
cases, this measure of influentiality reduces to standard measures of network centrality:
for example when the demand function is a linear or power function, the influentiality
measure simplifies to Bonacich centrality, but I provide other examples which make the
measure equivalent to degree centrality or even independent of network structure.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the related
literature. Section 3 introduces the model, illustrates it with some examples of networks,
and discusses the regularity assumptions. Section 4 provides the main characterization
result and describes the main components of the proof—in particular, how the charac-
terization overcomes two main complications that arise from non-linearities in demand
and interconnected decisions on the network. Section 5 interprets the characterization
by comparing it with some known benchmarks and then discusses the key distortion—
multiple-marginalization. Section 6 studies which of the firms are more influential and
discusses the relationship between the implied influentiality measure with standard net-
work centrality measures. Section 7 describes how to apply the characterization result
to compute the equilibrium and provides further results for some of the most common
demand functions (including linear, power, and logit). Section 8 concludes and discusses
policy implications for mergers and trade. All proofs are in appendix A.
2 Related Literature
Network games. Price setting on networks and supply chains is extensively studied in
several branches of economics literature. Perhaps most directly the paper contributes to
the literature on network games, where players take actions on a fixed network and the
payoffs depend both on their own and their neighbors’ actions. According to a survey by
Jackson and Zenou (2015), most works in this literature can be divided into two groups.
First, a lot of progress has been made in games with quadratic payoffs (or more generally,
payoffs that imply linear best-responses). A seminal paper is Ballester et al. (2006) who
show that in such games the equilibrium actions are proportional to Bonacich centrality.
Bramoullé and Kranton (2007); Calvó-Armengol et al. (2009); Bramoullé et al. (2014);
and Allouch (2017) study more general variation of this game and find that Bonacich
centrality still determines the equilibrium behavior. Candogan et al. (2012); Bloch and
Quérou (2013); Fainmesser and Galeotti (2016); Ushchev and Zenou (2018) study pricing
of goods with network externalities with quadratic payoffs and find that optimal pricing
leads to discounts that are proportional to Bonacich centrality. Bimpikis et al. (2019)
study Cournot competition on a bipartite network, where the sellers Cournot-compete in
markets which they have access to. They show that when the demands are linear and
costs quadratic, the equilibrium behavior is proportional to Bonacich centrality.
The second branch of network games studies games with non-quadratic payoffs and is
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generally able to analyze only qualitative properties of the equilibria rather than provide
a full characterization.23 A seminal paper is Galeotti et al. (2010). Compared to these
works, in this paper, I provide a characterization result for a game on a network with
relatively general payoff structure. The characterization defines a natural new measure
of influentiality and the firms’ choices and payoffs are proportional to this measure. In
special cases when the best-response functions are linear (such as linear demand), this
measure is proportional to Bonacich centrality. But as the weights are endogenously
defined by the demand function and equilibrium behavior, for all other demand functions
the measure of influentiality differs from Bonacich centrality. Indeed, I provide examples
of special cases where it can be equivalent to degree centrality or even independent of the
network structure.
Industrial organization. The paper contributes also to theoretical literature on ver-
tical integration. Spengler (1950) was the first to describe the double-marginalization
problem and after this the literature has extensively studied the benefits and costs of ver-
tical control, including Mathewson and Winter (1984); Grossman and Hart (1986); Rey
and Tirole (1986); Salinger (1988, 1989); Riordan (1998); Ordover et al. (1990); Farrell
and Shapiro (1990); Bolton and Whinston (1993); Kuhn and Vives (1999); Nocke and
White (2007); and Buehler and Gärtner (2013).4 Empirical work shows that produc-
tion has a network structure (Atalay et al., 2011), merger-like behaviors such as airline
codeshare agreements may fail to eliminate double-marginalization (Gayle, 2013), and
removing vertical restraints may hurt consumers (Luco and Marshall, 2018). This litera-
ture analyzes many forms of competition and contract structures, but very little is known
about networks with more than two levels (upstream-downstream). In this paper, I focus
on a simple contract structure (posted prices) and allow only relatively simple competi-
tion rules (either price-takers or monopolists), but extend the analysis to general network
structures.
Trade and macroeconomics. Supply chains are also studied in international trade and
macroeconomics.5 Empirical work by Bernard et al. (2010); Ahn et al. (2011); Jones (2011)
shows that intermediaries play a major role in international trade and work by Alfaro et al.
(2016) and Conconi et al. (2018) show that tariffs and trade barriers have a major impact
on the supply chains that are formed. Chaney (2014) documents that international trade
has a network structure—firms export only to markets where they have contacts. Spencer
and Jones (1991) were the first to embed vertical restraints into the trade model, Antràs
and Costinot (2011) introduced a trade model where intermediaries reduce search frictions,
and Rauch and Watson (2004) showed that intermediaries may have insufficient incentives
2An exception is Choi et al. (2017), who study price competition on networks, where consumers
choose the cheapest paths from source to destination and intermediaries set prices, thus making the game
a generalization of Bertrand competition. Choi et al. (2017) provide a full equilibrium characterization
of prices without relying on quadratic preferences.
3 In settings where the players interact on a network randomly, the characterization is often more
tractable. This line of research includes, for example, Manea (2011); Abreu and Manea (2012) who study
bargaining on networks.
4See Vickers and Waterson (1991) for a literature review.
5For a surveys of strategic trade literature, see Rauch (2001) and Spencer and Brander (2008).
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for efficient outcomes. The literature on the network formation in production and trade,
such as Oberfield (2018) and Liu (2018), is perhaps the closest to the current paper and
provides complementary results. It studies network formation, where entrepreneurs choose
which inputs to use in their (typically Cobb-Douglas) production technology. In contrast
to most of the trade and macroeconomics literature, I study optimal price-setting on a
fixed network, where many agents, including the middle-men, have some market power.
Supply chain management. There is also a specialized supply chain management
literature, started by Forrester (1961). This literature mostly focuses on other dimen-
sions of supply chain management, but perhaps the closest to the magnified multiple-
marginalization problem in the current paper is the idea of the bullwhip effect, intro-
duced by Lee et al. (2004). If firms in the supply chain make sequential choices learning
about demand only from orders, then the distortion tends to increase with each addi-
tional level of interactions. Empirical research by Metters (1997) shows the quantitative
importance of this effect. Bhattacharya and Bandyopadhyay (2011) provide a literature
review, highlighting 19 different causes documented by the literature. These causes are
mostly statistical, behavioral, and practical, and one contribution of the current paper is
to add multiple-marginalization to this list—even if all firms in the supply chain network
are perfectly informed and fully rational, the monopoly distortions accumulate with more
inter-dependencies on networks. There are a few works that bring related ideas to the
supply chain management literature. Liu et al. (2007) study a model similar to this pa-
per, but with just two firms and find that Stackelberg leadership leads to worse outcomes.
Perakis and Roels (2007) study efficiency loss from decentralization (in terms of the price
of anarchy) in supply chains. In this paper, I show that the marginalization problem is a
general problem for supply chains and is magnified by strategic interactions.
Sequential and aggregative games. Methodologically, the paper builds on recent ad-
vances in sequential and aggregative games. In a special case, where the firms are making
independent decisions (and thus the network is irrelevant), the model is an aggregative
game. Aggregative games were first proposed by Selten (1970) and there has been recent
progress in aggregative games literature by Jensen (2010); Martimort and Stole (2012);
and Acemoglu and Jensen (2013) that has been used to shed new light on questions in
industrial organization by Nocke and Schutz (2018).6 One classical aggregative game is a
contest and this paper builds on recent work on sequential contests by Hinnosaar (2018)
extending the methodology to networks and asymmetric costs.7
6For a literature review on aggregative games, see Jensen (2017). Note that when the number of
players is infinitely large, then these games become mean-field games (see for example Jovanovic and
Rosenthal (1988)).
7There are other papers belonging to the intersection of contests and networks literature, including
Franke and Öztürk (2015) and Matros and Rietzke (2018) who study contests on networks and Goyal
et al. (2019) who study contagion on networks.
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3 Model
3.1 Setup
The model is static and studies the supply of a single final good. The final good has a
demand function D(P ), where P is its price. The production and supply process requires
m + n inputs. I normalize the units of inputs so that one unit of each input is required
to produce one unit of output.
Input i is produced by firm i, that has a constant marginal cost ci and a price pi
for its product.8 The price pi is firm i’s per-unit revenue net of payments to other firms
in the model. Due to normalization, the quantity of firm i’s product (i.e. quantity of
input i) is equal to D(P ). Therefore firm i gets profit pii(p) = (pi − ci)D(P ), where
p = (p1, . . . , pm+n) and the price of the final good is the sum of all net prices, P =
∑m+n
i=1 pi.
I assume that m of the inputs n + 1, . . . , n + m are produced by price-takers, who
treat their prices as fixed. Such firm i may operate in a competitive sector or compete as
a Bertrand competitor, in which case its price is equal to the marginal cost of the second
cheapest firm in this sector. The firm could also operate in a regulated industry and its
price is set by a regulator.
The remaining n firms 1, . . . , n are monopolists, who set their prices strategically, i.e.
maximizing profits, anticipating the impact on sales of the final good. To complete the
description of the model, I need to specify how the price pi of firm i affects the behavior of
other monopolists, which I do by introducing the network of influences. Formally, network
of influences consists of all n monopolists as nodes and edges that define influences. The
edges are described as an n× n adjacency matrix A, where an element aij = 1 indicates
that firm i influences firm j. That is, when firm j chooses price pj, then it takes price pi
as given and responds optimally to it. Of course, firm i knows this and when choosing
pi, it knows that j will respond optimally. Finally, if i and j are not directly linked, i.e.
aij = aji = 0, then neither responds to deviations by the other firm. They expect the
other firm to behave according to its equilibrium strategy. For convenience, I assume that
the diagonal elements aii = 0. I will discuss a few examples of the network of influences
in the next subsection.
Let me make three remarks about the model here. First, the price-takers are non-
strategic players, so without loss of generality I replace them by a single parameter c0 =∑n+m
i=n+1 pi. Parameter c0 can be interpreted as a cost for the supply chain. I denote the
total per-unit cost to the supply chain by C = c0 +
∑n
i=1 ci.
Second, the analysis does not require that each firm on the supply chain is either always
a price-taker or always a monopolist. The assumption that I use in the characterization
is that monopolists behave according to their local optimality condition, whereas price-
takers take their prices locally as given. It could be that a firm who is a monopolist in
one situation becomes a price-taker when the model parameters change.
Third, the network of influences makes the game sequential. If aij = 1 then firm i
sets its price pi before firm j. Firm j then observes pi and may respond optimally. Of
course, firm i knows this and therefore can anticipate the response of firm j. I am looking
8The assumptions that marginal costs are constant and that firms choose prices rather than more
complex contracts are restrictive and can be relaxed, but would lead to much less tractable analysis.
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for a pure-strategy9 subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, where players take some of the
choices of other players as given and maximize their profits, anticipating the impact on
other players’ choices and the final good demand.
3.2 Examples of Network of Influences
The network of influences I introduce in this paper is related but not the same as the
supply-chain network. Typical supply-chain network specifies the flows of goods and
services (material flows), as well as the flows of money and information. The specifics
of these flows are neither necessary nor sufficient to characterize pricing decisions. For
pricing decisions, the model needs to specify what is known to each monopolist at the
moment it makes a pricing decision and how it expects this decision to influence the
choices of other firms. In other words, the model needs to specify the observability of
prices and commitment power of firms. As described above, I model this by assuming
that there is a commonly known network, such that whenever there is an edge from i to
j, firm j observes pi and therefore takes it into account in its optimization problem.
Consider first a very simple case with just two firms, F (final goods producer) and
R (retailer). Then there are three possible networks, illustrated by figure 1. First, case
(figure 1a) has no influences, so that firms set their prices pF and pR independently and the
final good is sold at P = pF + pR. This could be a reasonable assumption in many cases.
For example, if both are big firms that interact with many similar firms. Then the final
goods producer F does not best-respond to a particular retailer R but to equilibrium p∗R
of a representative retailer. Similarly, the retailer does not best-respond to deviations by
particular producer F , but to equilibrium price p∗F of a representative producer. Another
example where it is natural to make this assumption is when two firms are separately
selling perfectly complementary products to final consumers.
Similarly, there could be many reasons for strategic influences. For example, a down-
stream influence from producer F to retailer R (figure 1b) may arise with a large producer
and small retailer, where the representative retailer reacts optimally to pricing by F . The
large producer knows that retailers respond to its pricing and therefore takes into account
how a representative retailer best-responds. Of course, the influence could go in the oppo-
site direction (as in figure 1c) for the same reason—a large retailer R knows that a small
producer F will best-respond to its price changes. In this paper, I take these influences
as given and simply assume that some firms have more commitment power than others
for exogenous reasons.
F R
(a) No influences
F R
(b) Downstream
F R
(c) Upstream
Figure 1: Example: Three possible two-player networks.
Let me illustrate the network of influences with three more examples. Figure 2 depicts
an example of a retail chain with downstream-to-upstream influences. In this example,
9Although I am not excluding the possibility of mixed-strategy equilibria, I show that there always
exists unique pure-strategy equilibrium, so it is natural to focus on it.
7
there is a strong retailer R, who can commit to adding a markup pR on top of the wholesale
price PW , so that the price of the final good will be P = PW +pr. The wholesalerW takes
pR as given and commits to its markup pW , so that when the distributor’s price is PD,
then wholesale price is PW = PD + pW and therefore final good price P = PD + pW + pR.
Then distributor D sets its markup pD taking markups pW and pR as given. Finally, the
final good producer F sets a price pF , taking into account that final consumer will pay
P = pF + pD + pW + pR.
F D W R
A =

F D W R
F 0 0 0 0
D 1 0 0 0
W 1 1 0 0
R 1 1 1 0

Figure 2: Example: Retail chain with downstream-to-upstream influences.
Influences can also go in the opposite direction. Figure 3 gives an example of a
production chain. In this example, there is a small producer F who produces final good
and uses three inputs, produced by intermediate good producers I1, I2, and I3. Firm F
takes the prices of its inputs PI1 , PI2 , and PI3 as given and chooses the price for the final
good, PF = P . Intermediate good producer I2 uses two raw materials as inputs, produced
respectively by R1 and R2. In this example, firm I2 when choosing PI2 takes PR1 and PR2
as given. Importantly, as firms I1 and I3 do not used these inputs, they do not know the
realized prices offered by R1 and R2 but they can make equilibrium conjectures. Therefore,
while firms I1 and I3 take into account the equilibrium prices P ∗Ri in their optimization
problem, they cannot respond to potential deviations in PRi , whereas firms I2 and F can
and do respond to these deviations. It is convenient to redefine prices as net prices, net
of transfers to the other firms, i.e. pR1 = PR1 , pR2 = PR2 , pI1 = PI1 , pI2 = PI2 − pR1 − pR2 ,
pI3 = PI3 , and pF = P − pI1 − pI2 − pI3 − pR1 − pR2 , so that
∑
i pi = P .
R1
R2
I1
I2
I3
F
A =

R1 R2 I1 I2 I3 F
R1 0 0 0 1 0 1
R2 0 0 0 1 0 1
I1 0 0 0 0 0 1
I2 0 0 0 0 0 1
I3 0 0 0 0 0 1
F 0 0 0 0 0 0

Figure 3: Example: Production chain with upstream-to-downstream influences.
There is no reason to assume that the flows of influence are all going in the same
direction or that the network is a tree. Figure 4 gives another example, where the same
raw material L (labor) is used by three firms, T (transport), F (final goods producer), and
C (communication). These three firms set their prices independently, but F additionally
takes the markups of the D (distributor) and R (retailer) as given.
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LT
F
C
D R
A =

L T F C D R
L 0 1 1 1 0 0
T 0 0 0 0 0 0
F 0 0 0 0 0 0
C 0 0 0 0 0 0
D 0 0 1 0 0 0
R 0 0 1 0 1 0

Figure 4: Example: a network with a small producer and a common raw-material producer
3.3 Regularity Assumptions
I make three technical assumptions that are sufficient for the existence and uniqueness
of the equilibrium. These assumptions are natural in most applications and simplify the
analysis, but could be relaxed. The first assumption specifies the class of networks.
Assumption 1. Network A is acyclic and transitive.10
It is natural to assume that the network is acyclic. If firm j takes pi as given, then it
simply cannot be that firm i takes its decision pj as given. Similarly for cycles of more
than two players. Note the assumption allows firms i and j to make independent choices
when aij = aji = 0 and the network does not have to be connected.
The transitivity requires that if i influences j and j influences k, then i also influences
k directly, i.e. k takes both pj and pi as given. In the examples above this was a natural
assumption. Relaxing transitivity assumption would add the possibility of signaling to
the game. For example, suppose that in the network described by figure 4 there is no
edge from R to F . Then firm F knows that pR will be added to the price, but does not
know the value. However, since F knows pD and D knows pR, the price pD may reveal
some information about pR. Transitivity assumption excludes such signaling possibilities
and thus simplifies the analysis significantly.11
The second regularity assumption puts standard restrictions on the demand function.
The demand function D(P ) is a smooth and strictly decreasing function. It either has a
finite saturation point P at which the demand is zero or converges to zero fast enough so
that profit maximization problem is well-defined.
Assumption 2. Demand function D : [0, P ) → R+ is continuously differentiable and
strictly decreasing in [0, P ) where P ∈ R+ could be finite or infinite. Moreover, it satisfies
limit condition limP→∞ PD(P ) = 0.
The third and final regularity assumption ensures that the demand function D(P )
is well-behaved so that the optimum of each firm can be found using the first-order
condition. It is typical in the literature to make a regularity assumption that D is twice
differentiable and profits single-peaked. In particular, in theoretical works the demand is
10Acyclicity: @i1, . . . , ik such that ai1i2 = · · · = aik−1ik = aiki1 = 1. Equivalently, An = 0. Transitivity:
if aij = ajk = 1, then aik = 1. Equivalently, A ≥ A2.
11Compared to typical signaling models, the private information here is about the choices of other
players (deviations in particular) rather than some underlying uncertainty.
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often assumed to be linear for tractability. However, in empirical literature logit demand
is more common. Here I make an assumption about the demand function that would be
analogous to the standard regularity assumption and covers both linear and logit demand
functions.
Let the depth of the network d(A) be the length of the longest path in A.12 For
example, in figure 4 depth d(A) = 3 (from the path R → D → F ). Moreover, let me
define a function
g(P ) = −D(P )
D′(P ) , (1)
which is a convenient alternative way to represent the demand function. Note that g(P ) =
P
ε(P ) , where ε(P ) = −dD(P )dP PD(P ) is the demand elasticity. Then I make the following
assumption about the shape of the demand function.
Assumption 3. g(P ) is strictly decreasing and d(A)-times monotone in P ∈ (0, P ), i.e.
for all k = 1, . . . , d(A), derivative dkg(P )
dPk
exists and (−1)k dkg(P )
dPk
≥ 0 for all P ∈ (0, P ).
To interpret the condition, let us look at the standard monopoly pricing problem
maxP pi(P ) = maxP (P −C)D(P ). Then the first-order necessary condition for optimality
of P ∗ is
pi′(P ∗) = D(P ∗) + (P ∗ − C)D′(P ∗) = 0 ⇒ P ∗ − C = g(P ∗), (2)
which illustrates the convenience of the g(P ) notation. Moreover, a sufficient condition
for optimality is pi′′(P ∗) ≤ 0 or equivalently 2[D′(P ∗)]2 ≥ D(P ∗)D′′(P ∗). Note that a
sufficient condition for this is [D′(P ∗)]2 ≥ D(P ∗)D′′(P ∗), which is equivalent to −g′(P ∗) ≥
0. Therefore in the standard monopoly problem, monotonicity of g(P ) guarantees that
monopoly profit has a unique maximum that can be found using the first-order approach.
For general networks, the condition is stronger, it also guarantees that best-responses
and best-responses to best-responses are well-behaved, so that the first-order approach is
valid.
As illustrated by the monopoly example, the condition is sufficient and not necessary,
but it is easy to check and it is satisfied for many applications. The following propo-
sition provides a formal statement, by showing that with many typical functional form
assumptions on D(P ), the function g(P ) is completely monotone, i.e. d-times monotone
for arbitrarily large d ∈ N. Therefore assumption 3 is satisfied with all networks.
Proposition 1 (Many demand functions imply completely monotone g(P )). Each of the
following demand functions implies d-times monotone g(P ) for any d ∈ N:
1. Linear demand D(P ) = a− bP with a, b > 0 ⇒ g(P ) = P − P , where P = a
b
> 0.
2. Power demand D(P ) = d β
√
a− bP with d, β, a, b > 0 ⇒ g(P ) = β(P − P ).
3. Logit demand D(P ) = d e−αP1+e−αP with d, α > 0 ⇒ g(P ) = 1α
[
1 + e−αP
]
.
4. Exponential demand D(P ) = a−beαP with a > b > 0, α > 0⇒ g(P ) = 1
α
[
Pe−αP − 1
]
.
Note that for all four functions assumption 2 is clearly also satisfied. Linear and
power demand functions have saturation point P , logit demand satisfies limP→∞ PD(P ) =
d limP→∞ 1αeαP = 0, and exponential demand has saturation point P =
1
α
log a
b
.
12Formally, d(A) is smallest d is such that Ad = 0.
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4 Characterization
In this section, I first discuss two examples that illustrate the complications that arise
from the non-linearities and the network structure. I use these examples to illustrate the
techniques that I use for equilibrium characterization. The main result of the paper is
the characterization theorem, that formalizes the approach.
4.1 Example: Non-linear Demand
The first example illustrates the complexities that arise from working with non-linear
demand function, when the decisions are sequential. Let us consider logit demandD(P ) =
e−P
1+e−P , costless production, and two monopolists, who choose their prices sequentially, as
indicated in figure 5. That is, first firm 1 chooses price p1, which is taken into account by
firm 2, when it chooses price p2. The price of the final good is P = p1 + p2.
1 2
A =
[ 1 2
1 0 1
2 0 0
]
Figure 5: Example: two sequential monopolists
The standard method of finding the equilibrium in this game is backward-induction
It starts by finding the best-response function of firm 2, by solving maxp2 p2D(p1 + p2).
The optimality condition is
dpi2
dp2
= D(p1 + p2) + p2D′(p1 + p2) = 0 ⇐⇒ ep2(1− p2) = e−p1 . (3)
Solving this, gives best-response function p∗2(p1) = 1 + W (e−(p1+1)), where W (·) is the
Lambert W function13. Substituting p∗2(p1) to the optimization problem of firm 1 gives
max
p1
p1D(p1 + p∗2(p1))⇒ 1 + e−(p1+1)−W (e
−(p1+1)) = p1
(
1 + −e
−(p1+1)W (e−(p1+1))
e−(p1+1) +W (e−(p1+1))
)
. (4)
Solving it numerically gives p∗1 ≈ 1.2088, therefore p∗2 ≈ 1.0994 and P ∗ ≈ 2.3082. How-
ever, there is no analytic solution to optimality condition (4). This implies that the
standard approach fails when the network is more complex than the one studied here.
The backward-induction cannot be used, since computing best-response functions and
substituting them to the maximization problems of other firms is not feasible. The is-
sue is tractability—since the optimality conditions are non-linear, solving them leads to
complex expressions. Replacing best-responses sequentially amplifies these complexities.
The solution to this problem comes from Hinnosaar (2018), which proposes charac-
terizing the behavior of the following players by inverted best-response functions. The
key observation is that although equation (3) is a highly non-linear function of p1 and p2
separately, fixing P = p1+p2 leads to a linear equation for p2 or equivalently p1 = P −p2.
13Function W (x) is defined as a solution to x =W (x)eW (x).
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Therefore, for a fixed price of the final good, P , it is straightforward to find the price if
firm 2 that is consistent with the final good price P . I denote this by f2(P ), i.e.
f2(P ) = p2 = −D(P )
D′(P ) = g(P )
where g(P ) = 1 + e−P . Firm 1 knows that if it sets its price to p1, the price of the final
good will satisfy P = p1 + f2(P ). Therefore we can think of firm 1’s problem as choosing
P to solve
max
P
[P − f2(P )]D(P ) ⇒ f1(P ) = p1 = P − f2(P ) = g(P )[1− f ′2(P )].
Therefore if the final good’s price in equilibrium is P ∗, then optimal behavior of both
players requires that P ∗ = f1(P ∗) + f2(P ∗) = 2g(P ∗) − g′(P ∗)g(P ∗). This equation is
straightforward to solve and the same argument can be easily extended to more players
choosing sequentially.
There is one more pattern in the particular expressions we get that the characterization
will exploit. Namely, the condition for equilibrium is
P ∗ = 2g(P ∗)− g′(P ∗)g(P ∗) = 2g1(P ∗) + g2(P ∗),
where g1(P ∗) = g(P ∗) and g2(P ∗) = −g′1(P ∗)g(P ∗). The expression on the right-hand side
consists of two elements. The first, 2g1(P ∗) captures the fact that there are two players
who each individually maximize their profits. The second g2(P ∗) captures the fact that
player 1 influences player 2. It is straightforward to verify that for example if we would
remove this influence, i.e. with two monopolists choosing their prices simultaneously, the
equilibrium condition would become P ∗ = 2g1(P ∗).
The main advantage of this approach is tractability. Instead of solving non-linear
equations in each step and inserting the resulting expressions to the next maximization
problems, which results in more complex non-linear expressions, this approach allows
combining all necessary conditions of optimality into one necessary condition. Under
assumptions 2 and 3, the resulting expression has a unique solution, which gives us a
unique candidate for an interior equilibrium. Under the same assumptions, the sufficient
conditions for optimality are also satisfied and therefore it determines unique equilibrium.
4.2 Example: Interconnected Decisions
The second example illustrates a new issue that arises in the case of networks—the deci-
sions are interconnected. For example, on the network depicted by figure 4, firms L and
D make independent decisions, but due to their positions, they have different views on
what happens before and after them. Firm D influences only F , but L influences T and
C as well. Similarly, D takes pR as given, whereas L does not observe pR and therefore
has to have an equilibrium conjecture about the optimal behavior of R. Therefore solving
the game sequentially is not possible anymore.
To illustrate this issue, consider the simple network illustrated by figure 6. Let us
assume that the demand is linear D(P ) = 1 − P , and there are no costs and no price-
takers.
12
12
3
4
A =

1 2 3 4
1 0 0 1 1
2 0 0 0 1
3 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0

Figure 6: Example: network with interconnected decisions
The strategies of the firms are respectively p∗1, p∗2, p∗3(p1), and p∗4(p1, p2). Let us first
consider the problem of player 4, who observes p1 and p2 and expects equilibrium behavior
from player 3. Therefore player 4 solves
max
p4≥0
p4 [1− p1 − p2 − p∗3(p1)− p4] ⇒ p∗4(p1, p2) =
1
2 [1− p1 − p2 − p
∗
3(p1)] .
While this condition provides a condition for the best-response function p∗4(p1, p2), we
have not yet characterized it, as it would require knowing p∗3(p1). Player 3 solves a similar
problem, but does not observe p2 and expects p4 to be p∗4(p1, p∗2)
max
p3≥0
p3 [1− p1 − p∗2 − p3 − p∗4(p1, p∗2)] ⇒ p∗3(p1) =
1
2 [1− p1 − p
∗
2 − p∗4(p1, p∗2(p1))] .
Again, computing this best-response function explicitly, requires knowing p∗4(p1, p2), but
also the equilibrium price of player 2, i.e. p∗2. To compute the best-response functions
explicitly (i.e. independently of each other), we first need to solve the equation system
that we get by inserting p∗2 to the optimality condition of player 4. This gives us
p∗3(p1) = p∗4(p1, p∗2) =
1
3 [1− p1 − p
∗
2] ⇒ p∗4(p1, p2) =
1
3 [1− p1] +
1
6p
∗
2 −
1
2p2.
Note the prices p3 and p4 we have now characterized are still not the true best-response
functions, since they depend on the equilibrium price p∗2, which is yet to be determined.
For this we need to solve the problem of player 2, who expects player 1 to choose equilib-
rium price p∗1
max
p2≥0
p2 [1− p∗1 − p2 − p∗3(p∗1)− p∗4(p∗1, p2)] .
Taking the first-order condition and evaluating it at p2 = p∗2 gives a condition
1
6 [2− 2p
∗
1 − 5p∗2] = 0. (5)
Finally, player 1 solves a similar problem, taking p∗2 as fixed, i.e.
max
p1≥0
p1 [1− p1 − p∗2 − p∗3(p1)− p∗4(p1, p∗2)] .
Again, taking the first-order condition and evaluating it at p1 = p∗1 gives
1
3 [1− 2p
∗
1 − p∗2] = 0. (6)
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Solving the equation system equations (5) and (6) gives us p∗1 = 38 , p
∗
2 = 14 . Inserting
these values to the functions derived above gives us the best-response functions p∗3(p1) =
1
4 − 13p1 and p∗4(p1, p2) = 38 − 13p1 − 12p2. We can also compute the equilibrium prices
p∗3(p∗1) = p∗4(p∗1, p∗2) = 18 . Therefore equilibrium price of the final good is P
∗ = 78 .
As the example illustrates, finding the equilibrium strategies requires solving a com-
bination of equation systems in parallel with finding the best-response functions. Each
additional edge in the network can create a new layer of complexity.
The inverted best-response approach solves this issue as follows. Consider the opti-
mization problem of firm 4. For given (p1, p2), it chooses optimal p4. We can rethink its
optimization problem as choosing the final good price P = p1 + p2 + p∗3(p1) + p4 that it
wants to induce. We can rewrite its maximization problem as
max
P
[P − p1 − p2 − p∗3(p1)]D(P ) ⇒ D(P ) + [P − p1 − p2 − p∗3(p1)]D′(P ) = 0,
which can be rewritten as P − p1 − p2 − p∗3(p1) = − D(P )D′(P ) = g(P ) = 1 − P . This is a
necessary condition for optimality, but since the problem is quadratic, it is easy to see that
it is also sufficient. This expression gives implicitly the best-response function p∗4(p1, p2).
But more directly, the expression in the left-hand-side is the optimal p4 that is consistent
with the final good price P and the optimal behavior of firm 4. Let us denote it by
f4(P ) = 1− P . The problem for the firm 3 is analogous and gives f3(P ) = 1− P .
Now, consider firm 2. Instead of choosing p2 it can again consider the choice of the
final good price P . Since only firm 4 observes its choice (and thus chooses p4 = f4(P ) as
a response to desired P ), the firm 2’s problem can be written as
max
P
[P−p∗1−p∗3(p∗1)−f4(P )]D(P ) ⇒ [1−f ′4(P )]D(P )+[P−p∗1−p∗3(p∗1)−f4(P )]D′(P ) = 0,
which gives us a condition f2(P ) = P − p∗1 − p∗3(p∗1) − f4(P ) = 2(1 − P ). Analogous
calculation for firm 1 gives f1(P ) = 3(1− P ). Now, the equilibrium price P ∗ of the final
good must be consistent with individual choices. Therefore we get a condition
P ∗ =
4∑
i=1
fi(P ∗) = 7(1− P ∗).
Solving this equation gives us P ∗ = 78 and individual prices p
∗
1 = 3(1 − P ∗) = 38 , p∗2 = 28 ,
and p∗3 = p∗4 = 18 .
Notice that the same calculations could be applied easily for non-linear demand func-
tions, with some g(P ) = −D(P )
D(P ) . This would give us an equilibrium condition
P ∗ =
4∑
i=1
fi(P ∗) = 4g1(P ∗) + 3g2(P ∗),
where g1(P ) = g(P ) and g2(P ) = −g′1(P )g(P ). This is again the same pattern that we
saw in the previous example, since the number of players is 4 and the number of edges is
3. In the case of linear demand, g1(P ) = g(P ) = 1− P and therefore g2(P ) = 1− P .
This example illustrates the advantage of the inverted best-response approach. As the
approach combines all necessary conditions into one, the issues of interconnected decisions
are automatically mitigated.
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4.3 Characterization
As illustrated by the examples above, it is useful to define functions g1, . . . , gn, which
capture relevant properties of the demand function. They are defined recursively as
g1(P ) = g(P ) = −D(P )
D′(P ) and gk+1(P ) = −g
′
k(P )g(P ). (7)
As the discussion about monopoly profit maximization and the examples illustrated, g1(P )
captures the standard concavity of the profit function, whereas g2(P ) captures the direct
discouragement effect when a firm observes the price of another firm. Functions g3, . . . , gn
play a similar role in describing higher-order discouragement effects.
Note also that the adjacency matrix A provides a convenient way to keep track of the
number of direct and indirect influences. Multiplying adjacency matrix with a column
vector of ones, A1, gives a vector with the number of edges going out from each player
(i.e. the sum over columns). Similarly, 1′A1 is the total number of edges on the network,
i.e. the total number of direct influences. Multiplying the adjacency matrix by itself, i.e.
A2 = AA gives a matrix that describes two-edge paths, i.e. element a2i,j is the number of
paths from i to j with one intermediate step. Similarly Ak is the matrix that describes
number of all k-step paths from each i to each j. When we take k = 0, then A0 is an
identity matrix, which can be interpreted as 0-step paths (clearly the only player that can
be reached from player i by following 0 edges is player i himself).
Therefore Ak1 is a vector whose elements are the numbers of k-step paths from player
i, which can be directly computed as e′iAk1, where ei is a column vector, where ith element
is 1 and other elements are zeros. Similarly, 1′Ak1 is the number of all k-step paths in
the network. The following expression makes these calculations for the network described
by figure 4, which has six players, six edges, and one two-edge path (R→ D → F ).

A01 A11 A21 A31
L 1 3 0 0
T 1 0 0 0
F 1 0 0 0
C 1 0 0 0
D 1 1 0 0
R 1 2 1 0
1′Ak−11 6 6 1 0

. (8)
With this notation, I can now state the main result of this paper, the characteri-
zation theorem that states that there exists a unique equilibrium and shows how it is
characterized using the components we have discussed.
Theorem 1. There is a unique equilibrium, the final good price P ∗ is the solution to
P ∗ − C =
n∑
k=1
1′Ak−11gk(P ∗), (9)
and the individual prices are p∗i = ci +
∑n
k=1 e
′
iA
k−11gk(P ∗) for all i.
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The proof in appendix A builds on the ideas discussed above. A few remarks are in
order. The uniqueness is straightforward to establish. Assumption 3 implies that each
gk(P ) is weakly decreasing (this is formally shown in lemma 2 in appendix A). The right-
hand side of equation (9) is therefore decreasing, whereas the left-hand side is strictly
increasing. Connection to inverted best-response functions is also clear, as the individual
prices are determined by p∗i = ci + fi(P ∗).
5 Multiple-marginalization Problem
Let me first interpret the equilibrium condition equation (9) by comparing it with the
known benchmark cases. First, when all firms are price-takers, then the network is empty
and therefore the right-hand side of (9) is zero. As expected, the equilibrium condition is,
therefore, P ∗ = C, i.e. price of the final good equals the marginal cost of the final good.
Standard arguments imply that this is also the welfare-maximizing solution.
Second, suppose that there is a single monopolist, i.e. n = 1 and A = [0]. Therefore
there is a single element on the right-hand side of (9) with value g1(P ∗). We can rewrite
the condition as
P ∗ − C
P ∗
= g1(P
∗)
P ∗
= 1
ε(P ∗) , (10)
which is the standard inverse-elasticity rule: mark-up (Lerner index) equals the inverse
elasticity. There is a usual monopoly distortion—as the monopolist does not internalize
the impact on the consumer surplus, the price equilibrium price of the final good is higher
and the equilibrium quantity lower than the social optimum. This is also the joint profit-
maximization outcome.
Third, consider n > 1 monopolists who are making their decisions simultaneously.
That is, the network has n nodes, but no edges. Analogously with a single monopolist,
we can then rewrite the equilibrium condition as
P ∗ − C
P ∗
= 1′A01g1(P
∗)
P ∗
= n
ε(P ∗) >
1
ε(P ∗) . (11)
The total markup is now strictly higher than in the case of a single monopolist. This is the
standard multiple-marginalization problem—firms do not internalize not only the impact
on consumer surplus but also the impact on the other firms. Therefore the distortion
is even larger than in the case of a single monopolist, which means that both the total
profits and the social welfare are reduced compared to a single monopolist.
The novel case studied in this paper is with multiple monopolists and some influences.
That is n > 0 and A 6= 0. In this case, the condition can be written as
P ∗ − C
P ∗
= n
ε(P ∗) +
n∑
k=2
1′Ak−11gk(P
∗)
P ∗
>
n
ε(P ∗) . (12)
The total markup and therefore the distortion is even higher than with n independent
monopolists. The intuition for this is simple: suppose that there is a single edge so that
firm i influences firm j. Then in addition to the trade-offs firm i had before, raising the
price now will reduce the profitability of firm j, who will respond by reducing its price.
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Therefore pi will be higher and pj lower than with simultaneous decisions. How about
the price of the final good, which depends on the sum of pi and pj? If the reduction in
pj would be so large that the total price does not increase, then pi would not be optimal,
since the profit of firm i is (pi− ci)D(P ), i.e. increasing in pi and decreasing P , so i would
want to raise the price even further. Thus in equilibrium, it should be that the price of
the final good is increased. I formalize and generalize this observation as corollary 1. The
corollary follows from equation (9) and non-negativity of gk functions.
Corollary 1 (Magnified Multiple-marginalization Problem). Suppose that there are two
networks A and B such that
1. 1′Ak−11 ≥ 1′Bk−11 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n} and
2. 1′Ak−11 > 1′Bk−11 for at least one k,
then both social welfare and total profit in the case of A is lower than with B.
The result shows that multiple-marginalization problem is increased with strategic
influences, but does not give a magnitude for it. To illustrate that the impact may be
severe, let me give some numeric examples. First, suppose that demand is linear, D(P ) =
1−P , there are no costs, and there are no price-takers. Then standard calculations imply
that the maximized total welfare would be 12 and a single monopolist would choose price
1
2 ,
which would lead to dead-weight loss of 18 . Therefore with any network dead-weight loss is
at least 18 and at most
1
2 . Figure 7 illustrates the difference between the dead-weight loss
in the best case (simultaneous decisions) and the worst case (sequential decisions).Even
in the best case (blue line with triangles) the multiple-marginalization problem can be
severe and is increasing in n. However, the distortions with strategic interactions (red
line with circles) are much higher for any n and the dead-weight loss approaches to full
destruction of the social welfare quickly. This comparison shows that strategic influences
magnify the multiple-marginalization problem with any n.
n
DWL
Figure 7: Example: comparison of dead-weight loss in the model with linear demand
between the best case (simultaneous decisions) and the worst case (sequential decisions)
How much the number of firms matters compared to strategic influences depends on
the shape of the demand function. This is illustrated by figure 8, which provides the same
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comparison with a more general power demand function D(P ) = β
√
1− P .14 When β < 1,
then relatively high weight is given to more direct influences. Indeed, figure 8a shows that
when β = 110 then the best-case and the worst-case dead-weight loss do not differ much.
On the other hand, when β > 1 the weight is larger on more indirect influences. This is
illustrated by figure 8b, where the difference between the two cases is large.
n
DWL
(a) β = 110
n
DWL
(b) β = 10
Figure 8: Examples: comparison of dead-weight loss with power demand D(P ) = β
√
1− P
between the best case (simultaneous decisions) and the worst case (sequential decisions)
6 Influentiality
6.1 A Measure of Influentiality
All monopolists on the network have some market power and therefore earn strictly pos-
itive profits. But some firms are more influential than others. Which ones and how does
this depend on the network? The answer comes directly from the characterization in
theorem 1. For brevity, let me denote
Ii(A) =
n∑
k=1
e′iA
k−11gk(P ∗), (13)
which is a sum of scalars e′iAk−11 weighted by gk(P ∗). Note that e′iA01 = 1, e′iA11 is
the number of players i influences, e′iA21 is the number of two-edge paths starting from
i, and so on. Therefore Ii(A) can be interpreted as a measure of influentiality of player i.
Fixing the equilibrium price of the final good P ∗, the individual markups are p∗i − ci =
Ii(A) and therefore profits pii(p∗) = (p∗i − ci)D(P ∗) = Ii(A)D(P ∗). Therefore Ii(A) fully
captures the details of the network that affect firm i’s action and payoff. Corollary 2
provides a formal statement.
14 Generally DWL(P ∗) =
∫ P∗
0 [D(P ) − D(P ∗)]dP . The calculations and the impact of β in case of
power demand function are discussed in more detail in the next section.
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Corollary 2 (Ii(A) Summarizes Influences). Ii(P ∗) > Ij(P ∗) if and only if pii(p∗) >
pij(p∗) and pi − ci > p∗j − cj.
This measure of influentiality Ii(A) depends both on the network structure and the
demand function. There are some cases when we can say more. In particular, if firm i
has more influences in all levels than firm j, i.e. e′iAk−11 ≥ e′jAk−11 for all k and the
inequality is strict for at least one k, then Ii(A) ≥ Ij(A) regardless of the weights gk(P ∗).
The inequality is strict whenever gk(P ∗) > 0 for k such that e′iAk−11 > e′jAk−11. For
example, when firm i influences firm j, then e′iAk−11 ≥ e′jAk−11 and the inequality is
strict for at least k = 1, so Ii(A) > Ij(A) with any demand function.
6.2 Connections with Network Centrality Measures
The measure of influentiality defined above is reminiscent of the classic measures of cen-
trality as the capture the same effects: a player is more influential if it influences either
more players or more influential players. The difference is that while the classic central-
ity measures are defined purely using network characteristics, the influentiality measure
defined here has endogenous weights that are determined by the model parameters such
as the demand function, costs, and also by the price of the final good.
In some special cases, the connection is even closer. Consider the case of power de-
mandD(P ) = d β
√
a− bP . As discussed in section 7.2, it implies linear gk(P ) = βk(P−P ).
Therefore Ii(A) = (P−P ∗)Bβi (A), where Bi(A)β =
∑n
k=1 β
ke′iA
k−11 is the Bonacich cen-
trality measure of player i. The general measure Ii(A) can be thought as a generalization
of Bonacich centrality where the weights are endogenously determined by the demand
function and the equilibrium, rather than having exponential decay βk.15 Linear demand
D(P ) = a− bP is a special case of power demand with β = 1. Therefore the influentiality
measure Ii(A) simplifies to Bonacich centrality measure with β = 1, i.e. equal weight for
each level of influences.
However, the influence measure does not always have to have a flavor of Bonacich
centrality. Let me provide two more examples to show this. First, suppose D(P ) =
de
√
2(a−bP )/b. This a specifically constructed demand function, which implies g(P ) =
g1(P ) =
√
2(a− bP ) and therefore g2(P ) = b, which means that gk(P ) = 0 for all k > 2.
With these weights the influentiality measure simplifies to Ii(A) =
√
2(a− bP ∗)+ be′iA1,
i.e. depends only on the number of players directly influenced by player i. That is, the
influentiality measure is a linear function of the degree centrality in this case.
For another example, consider logit demand D(P ) = d e−αP1+e−αP . As I will show in
section 7.3, it may lead to complex expressions, but when n is large enough, then g1(P ∗) ≈
1
α
and gk(P ∗) ≈ 0 for k > 1. Therefore Ii(A) ≈ 1α . This means that in the case of logit
demand with sufficiently many players, the network structure does not affect the pricing of
the individual firms. The relevant centrality measure is approximately a constant. These
observations are summarized by table 1.
15Note that the standard definition of Bonacich centrality requires β < 1, because otherwise the sum
may not converge and thus the measure would not be well-defined. As the influence networks here are
acyclic, any β > 0 is allowed. Values β ≥ 1 arise whenever D(P ) = d β√a− bP , which is a quite natural
assumption for a demand function.
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Demand D(P ) Influentiality Ii(A) Equivalent Network Centrality Measure
Power d β
√
a− bP
(
a
b
− P ∗
)
Bβi (A) B
β
i (A) = Bonacich centrality (with β)
Linear a− bP
(
a
b
− P ∗
)
Bi(A) Bi(A) = Bonacich centrality with β = 1
de
√
2(a−bP )/b
√
2(a− bP ∗) + bDi(A) Di(A) = e′iA1 = Degree centrality
Logit d e−αP1+e−αP → 1α Approximately a constant
Table 1: Examples of demand functions with which the measure of influentiality Ii(A)
simplifies to one of the standard network centrality measures
7 Computing the Equilibrium
In this subsection I show how the equilibrium characterization could be used to com-
pute the equilibrium and study some of the most common demand functions where the
characterization is even simpler.
7.1 Linear Demand
Suppose that the demand function is linear D(P ) = a − bP . Then g(P ) = − D(P )
D′(P ) =
P − P = g1(P ) with P = ab and therefore for all k > 1, gk+1(P ) = −g′k(P )g(P ) = P − P .
Equation (9) simplifies to
P ∗ − C =
n∑
k=1
1′Ak−11gk(P ∗) = (P − P ∗)B(A), (14)
where B(A) = ∑nk=1 1′Ak−11 is the sum of the number of influences of all levels, i.e. the
number of players (1′A01 = n) plus the number of edges plus the number of two-edge
paths, and so on. Equation (14) is a linear equation and its solution is the equilibrium
price
P ∗ = C + PB(A)1 +B(A) . (15)
As we would expect, increasing costs and increasing demand (P = a
b
in particular) will
raise the equilibrium price, but the pass-through is imperfect. Increasing the number of
firms or the number of connections between firms increases the equilibrium price through
the marginalization effects discussed above. Similarly, we can compute the markups for
individual firms,
p∗i = ci +
n∑
k=1
e′iA
k−11gk(P ∗) = ci +
Bi(A)
1 +B(A)(P − C), (16)
where Bi(A) =
∑n
k=1 e
′
iA
k−11 is the sum of influences of firm i, i.e. e′iA01 = 1 (“influ-
encing” oneself) plus e′iA11 = number of players i influences plus the number of paths
starting from i. By construction B(A) = ∑ni=1Bi(A).
Consider the example of network described by figure 4, for which the corresponding
Ak−11 terms are computed in equation (8). Suppose that D(P ) = 1 − P , and there
are no costs, and no price-takers (C = 0). Then B(A) = 6 + 6 + 1 = 13 and therefore
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P ∗ = B(A)1+B(A) =
13
14 . Similarly, individual prices p
∗
i =
Bi(A)
1+B(A) . For example, p
∗
L = 414 , p
∗
T =
p∗F = p∗C = 114 , p
∗
D = 214 , and p
∗
R = 414 . In particular, observe that p
∗
L = p∗R, but for
different reasons—firm L influences three firms directly, whereas R influences two firms
directly and one indirectly. In the case of linear demand, these two types of influences
are weighted equally.
7.2 Power Demand
The calculations are similar for more general power demand D(P ) = d β
√
a− bP . Then
g(P ) = β(P − P ) with P = a
b
and therefore gk(P ) = βk(P − P ), so that equation (9)
gives the same expression for the equilibrium price of the final good
P ∗ = C + PB
β(A)
1 +Bβ(A) (17)
but now Bβ(A) = ∑nk=1 βk1′Ak−11, i.e. the influences in various levels are weighted by
1, β, β2, . . . . Then β can be interpreted as a decay or discount factor for more indirect
influences.16 Similarly for individual firms,
p∗i = ci +
Bβi (A)
1 +Bβ(A)(P − C), (18)
where Bβi (A) =
∑n
k=1 β
ke′iA
k−11, i.e. influences are again weighted by factor βk.
Consider the example from figure 4 again, with C = 0, and demand function D(P ) =√
β(1 − P ). In particular, if D(P ) = (1 − P )2, then β = 12 and therefore B
1
2 (A) =
6 + 126 +
1
41 =
37
4 , so P
∗ = 3741 . As anticipated above, since higher weight is on direct
influences than indirect influences, firm L sets a higher price (and earns higher profit)
than firm R, p∗L = 1041 > p
∗
R = 941 . This is also the reason why the difference in the
worst-case and the best-case on figure 8a was relatively small. On the other hand, if
D(P ) =
√
1− P , then β = 2 which implies P ∗ = 2223 and p∗L = 723 < p∗D = 923 , since now
the weight is higher on indirect influences. This explains the larger difference in figure 8b.
7.3 Logit Demand
Take logit demand D(P ) = d e−αP1+e−αP with α > 0. Then g(P ) =
1
α
[
1 + e−αP
]
.
Let us first consider the example discussed in previous subsections to illustrate how the
characterization result could be used for more complicated demand functions. Suppose
again that C = 0 and the network is the one described by figure 4. Since the depth of the
network is d(A) = 3, we need to compute functions
g1(P ) = g(P ) =
1
α
[
1 + e−αP
]
,
g2(P ) = −g′1(P )g(P ) =
1
α
[
1 + e−αP
]
e−αP ,
g3(P ) = −g′2(P )g(P ) =
1
α
[
1 + e−αP
]
e−αP
[
1 + 2e−αP
]
.
16Note that β > 0 (as otherwise demand would not be decreasing), but it can be bigger or smaller than
1. In fact, when β = 1 the demand function is linear, so that Bβ(A) = B(A).
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nP∗
n − 1
Figure 9: Bounds for equilibrium prices with logit demand D(P ) = e−P1+e−P and C = 0
depending on the number of firms.
The equilibrium condition (9) takes the form P ∗ = 6g1(P ∗) + 6g2(P ∗) + g3(P ∗), which is
straightforward to solve numerically. For example, when α = 1, we get
P ∗ = 6 + 13e−P ∗ + 9e−2P ∗ + 2e−3P ∗ ,
which implies P ∗ ≈ 6.0313 and individual prices p∗L ≈ 1.0096, p∗T = p∗F = p∗C ≈ 1.0024, p∗D ≈
1.0048, and p∗R ≈ 1.0096.
The numeric results point to a more specific property of the equilibrium behavior
in the case of logit demand. Namely, all prices are only slightly above 1. Inspecting
gk(P ) functions above reveals the reason. Namely, the term e−αP
∗ converges to zero as P ∗
increases. Therefore, for sufficiently large P ∗, the weight g1(P ∗) converges to a constant 1α ,
whereas the weights gk(P ∗) for k > 1 converge to zero. Therefore, if the equilibrium price
P ∗ is large enough, it is almost fully driven by the number of players. This observation
is formalized as the following lemma 1.
Lemma 1 (Approximate Equilibrium with Logit Demand). With logit demand D(P ) =
d e
−α
1+e−αP , the price of final good P
∗ and individual prices p∗i satisfy the following conditions
1. P ∗ > C + n
α
and p∗i > ci + 1α for all i,
2. P ∗ = C + n
α
+O
([
2
e
]n)
and p∗i = ci + 1α +O
([
2
e
]n)
for all i.17
Lemma 1 implies when n is large enough, then P ∗ ≈ C + n
α
and each p∗i ≈ ci + 1α .
This is a limit result, but as we saw from the example above, the approximation with
n = 6 seems already quite precise. Figure 9 illustrates that the convergence is indeed
fast. It shows that while for small numbers of players, there is a difference between the
lower bound (simultaneous decisions) and the upper bound (sequential decisions), the
difference shrinks quickly and becomes negligible with 5–10 players. In particular, the
figure illustrates that 1
n
[
P ∗ − C − n
α
]
≈ 0 for any network with about ten players or
more.
17 Where f(n) = O(g(n)) means that lim supn→∞
∣∣∣ f(x)g(x) ∣∣∣ <∞.
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8 Discussion
This paper characterizes the equilibrium behavior for a general class of price-setting games
on a network. Under regularity assumptions, there is a unique equilibrium, which is
straightforward to compute even with arbitrary demand function and complex networks.
For the most common demand functions, such as linear, power, and logit demand, I
provide even simpler characterization results.
The key distortion is the multiple-marginalization, which leads to too high markups
both for efficiency and joint profit maximization. The marginalization problem increases
with the number of firms but is magnified by strategic interactions. Firms set too high
markups, not only because they do not internalize the negative impact on consumer
surplus and other firms’ profits, but also because they benefit from discouraging the other
firms to set high markups.
The results define a natural measure of influentiality that ranks firms according to
their markups and profits. Firms are more influential if they influence more firms or more
influential firms. In some special cases, the influentiality measure simplifies to standard
measures of centrality. I give examples, where it takes the form of Bonacich centrality,
degree centrality, or is independent of the network structure.
Although the results are quite general in terms of network structure and demand
functions, there are significant simplifying assumptions in other dimensions. First, I
assume constant marginal costs, which simplifies the characterization but is not crucial
for the analysis. Second, I model the competition in an extreme way—firms are either
monopolists or price-takers. In some sense, this covers a few intermediate cases, where
firms may be monopolists in some range, but when prices become too high, they become
price-takers. But it would be certainly interesting to study other forms of imperfect
competition, repeated interactions, bargaining, and more complex contract structures
than posted prices.
In this paper, the analysis is described in terms of price setting on a supply-chain
network that supplies a single final product. There are other applications fitting the same
mathematical model. An obvious example is multiple monopolists sell perfect comple-
ments. More generally, the model applies whenever multiple players choose actions, so
that their payoffs depend linearly on their own actions, the marginal benefit is a decreasing
function of the total action, and the actions are (higher-order) strategic substitutes. For
example, the private provision of public goods and contests satisfy this general description.
Finally, the results have significant policy implications, which I have not discussed so
far. In the following, I describe two simple examples to highlight two important policy
implications. First, when analyzing mergers and acquisitions, it is crucial for the regulator
to consider how the network of influences is affected. Second, in trade policy, small
increases in any tariffs typically hurt all players, but more influential firms are harmed
the most. Moreover, when considering non-marginal changes in trade policy, it is again
crucial to consider the impact on the network as a whole.
8.1 Example: Mergers
To highlight how merger policy can be affected by changes in the network of influences,
consider the following example with five monopolists. Firm 1 produces raw material that
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is an input for two intermediate good producers, firms 2 and 3. Then final good producer
firm 4 uses inputs from firms 1, 2, and 3 to produce the final good and sells it to final
consumer through a retailer, firm 5. The material flows are illustrated in figure 10a.
However, it is important to specify how firms influence each other. Suppose that firms
2 and 4 are influenced by firm 1. Firm 3 makes the choice independently of firm 1 and
influences firm 4. Finally, firm 5 makes its choice independently of other firms. This is
illustrated by figure 10b. To make the example more concrete, suppose that there are
no costs and the demand function is D(P ) = (1 − P )4, which allows us to use explicit
formulas from section 7.2.
Suppose now that firms 1 and 2 would like to merge, leading to a new supply chain
illustrated by figure 10e. Should the competition authority approve the merger? There
are a few important aspects that the policymaker may consider. First, how does it affect
the competition? By assumptions, we are analyzing the production of a single product
with fixed demand function and monopolistic input providers, so the competition remains
unaffected. Second, does it lead to cost-reductions or synergies? Again, we assume that
there are no costs, so this remains unaffected. Third, there is one less firm, which reduces
the marginalization problem. Combining these arguments, conventional wisdom suggests
that the merger is socially desirable.
1
2
3
4 5
(a) Pre-merger material flows
1
2
3
4 5
(b) Pre-merger influences
1+2
3
4 5
(c) Scenario A material flows
1+2
3
4 5
(d) Scenario A influences
1+2
3
4 5
(e) Scenario B material flows
1+2
3
4 5
(f) Scenario B influences
Figure 10: Examples: merger scenarios for firms 1 and 2.
Using results from section 7.2 to computing the pre-merger price of the final good gives
us P ∗ ≈ 0.5897. The corresponding profits, consumer surplus (CS) and social welfare
(SW = CS+∑i pii) are given in table 2. Let us compare it with the simplest post-merger
scenario (let us call it scenario A, see figure 10d), where the newly merged firm 1 + 2
continues to influence only firm 4. Then the new price of the final good is PA ≈ 0.5294.
This is clearly better for both the social welfare and for the total profit, due to a reduction
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in marginalization. Indeed, table 2 shows that the post-merger 1 scenario gives higher
consumer surplus, total profit, social welfare, and all non-merging firms. But the joint
profit of the merging firms 1 and 2 decreases from 0.0073 to 0.0072. The reason for this
is that although the total profit has increased, the sum of the influences of the two firms
decreased with the merger. This decrease in influentiality is large enough to make this
merger undesirable for them. In a situation where they asked for permission to merge,
this is probably not the right scenario to consider.
Scenario P ∗ ∑i pi∗i pi∗1 + pi∗2 pi∗3 pi∗4 pi∗5 CS SW
(1) Demand function D(P ) = (1− P )4
Pre-merger 0.5897 0.0167 0.0073 0.0036 0.0029 0.0029 0.0023 0.0190
Scenario A 0.5294 0.0260 0.0072 0.0072 0.0058 0.0058 0.0046 0.0306
Scenario B 0.5461 0.0232 0.0075 0.0060 0.0048 0.0048 0.0039 0.0270
(2) Demand function D(P ) = (1− P ) 43
Pre-merger 0.8447 0.0705 0.0341 0.0170 0.0097 0.0097 0.0056 0.0761
Scenario B 0.8363 0.0749 0.0337 0.0192 0.0110 0.0110 0.0063 0.0812
(3) Demand function D(P ) = (1− P ) 34
Pre-merger 0.9231 0.1348 0.0699 0.0350 0.0150 0.0150 0.0064 0.1412
Scenario B 0.9288 0.1281 0.0713 0.0306 0.0131 0.0131 0.0056 0.1337
(4) Demand function D(P ) = (1− P )5
Pre-merger 0.5283 0.0123 0.0053 0.0026 0.0022 0.0022 0.0018 0.0142
Scenario A 0.4681 0.0199 0.0054 0.0054 0.0045 0.0045 0.0038 0.0237
Table 2: Examples of merger scenarios: Panel 1: Scenario B is a Pareto improvement
compared to the pre-merger situation. Scenario A is socially desirable, but firms 1 and
2 would choose not to merge. Panel 2: Scenario B would still be socially desirable, but
would not happen voluntarily. Panel 3: Scenario B is socially undesirable, but would
happen. Panel 4: Even scenario B is a Pareto improvement.
Suppose alternatively that after the merger, the new firm 1+2 becomes more influen-
tial, so that it can also influence the decision of firm 3, as illustrated by figure 10f. In this
case, the equilibrium price of the final good is PB ≈ 0.5461, which is still lower than the
pre-merger price, so that this merger is socially desirable. Moreover, the joint profit of
the merging firms is now 0.0075, which is larger than the sum of their pre-merger profits.
As table 2 illustrates, this scenario is, in fact, a strict Pareto-improvement compared to
pre-merger—consumer surplus, profits of all firms (including non-merging), and social
welfare strictly increase. The reason is that the additional influences (one direct and one
indirect) allow the new firm 1 + 2 capture a larger share of the surplus and this makes
the merger desirable for them.
Note that these conclusions depend on the details of the network structure as well as
the demand function. In scenario B, there is one less firm, the same number of direct
influences, and one more indirect influence than in the pre-merger case. Whether or
not it is socially preferable depends on the weights on different levels of influences. The
particular demand function D(P ) = (1 − P )4 is a power demand where the weights are
declining at rate β = 14 . That is, indirect influences affect marginalization less than
direct influences and therefore the merger is still socially desirable. Similarly, the joint
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influentiality of firms 1 and 2 depends on the weights. Panel 2 in table 2 illustrates that
when the demand function is D(P ) = (1 − P ) 43 , i.e. β = 34 , which puts more weight on
the indirect weights, then the conclusions change. The merger is still socially desirable,
but now the new firm 1+2 does not have enough influence to make the merger desirable.
Panel 3 in table 2 shows that if D(P ) = (1−P ) 34 , so that β = 43 > 1 and therefore indirect
influences have larger weight than direct influences, this merger is not socially desirable
anymore. However, in this case, the influentiality of the new firms is so large that they
would prefer to merge. Finally, panel 4 shows that if D(P ) = (1−P )5, then the weight on
indirect influences is so low that even a merger without any additional influences (scenario
A) is a Pareto improvement compared to the pre-merger situation.
This example shows that even in simple cases the changes in the network of influences
may have drastic policy implications. Note that the example is simple enough so that
the equilibria can be computed directly. Theorem 1 provides a characterization for all
possible scenarios when the demand function and the network may be more complex.
8.2 Example: Tariffs
The previous discussion already illustrates the importance of taking the changes in the
network of influences into account when considering policy decisions. The same message
applies to trade policies as well. Changes in tariffs or quotas, as well as any trade re-
strictions, influence the supply chains and the interactions of firms within a supply chain.
Therefore they naturally impact the network of influences. The results in this paper
provide a tool to compare the outcomes under different scenarios.
In the simplest case when changes in tariffs are marginal so that the network of influ-
ences is unchanged, theorem 1 provides specific predictions. In particular, let us assume
that the marginal cost of each input is ci = cˆi+ti, where cˆi is the physical cost and ti is the
tariff on good i. Then changes in tariffs can be thought of as changes in c = (c0, c1, . . . , cn).
When the changes are marginal, only the total marginal cost C = ∑ni=0 ci affects the
equilibrium price, profits, consumer surplus, and total welfare. Moreover, the equilib-
rium price is increasing and all payoffs are decreasing with C. This is easy to see from
equation (9). Differentiating the equation gives
P ∗ −
n∑
k=1
1′Ak−11gk(P ∗) = C ⇒ dP
∗
dC
= 1
1−∑nk=1 1′Ak−11g′k(P ∗) > 0. (19)
as each g′k(P ∗) ≤ 0. Therefore only the aggregate changes in tariffs affect the equilibrium
price of the final good. Clearly, consumer surplus depends only on the price of the final
good. Although individual prices p∗i are affected by individual tariffs, the individual
equilibrium profits pii(p∗) = Ii(A)D(P ∗) are only affected by tariffs through its impact
on the price of the final good. Any increase in the sum of tariffs leads to an increase
in the price of the final good and therefore decrease in profits that are proportional to
influentiality measure Ii(A). So, the more influential firms are affected more by the tariffs,
regardless of which individual tariffs or subsidies are imposed. Finally, defined as the sum
of consumer surplus, all profits, and the tariff revenues are marginally affected as
TW =
∫ ∞
P ∗
D(P )dP︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Consumer Surplus
+D(P ∗)(P ∗ − Cˆ − T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
∑
i
pi∗i
+D(P ∗)T. (20)
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Direct effects of tariffs cancel out as profits are reduced exactly by the tariff revenue. The
only effect is through the change in the price of the final good, which is increasing in
tariffs. Differentiating total welfare with respect to the equilibrium price of the final good
gives
dTW
dP ∗
= −D(P ∗)+D′(P ∗)(P ∗− Cˆ)+D(P ∗) = D′(P ∗)(P ∗− Cˆ) < 0 ⇐⇒ P ∗ > Cˆ. (21)
This is a standard textbook finding implying that the socially optimal tax on a monopoly
is, in fact, a subsidy that equalizes price with marginal cost.
Note that there are important aspects missing from this simple application of the
model. The main goal of using tariffs and other trade policies is to affect trade flows.
This changes the supply chain network and the network of influences. As highlighted in
the discussion above, it may have a large impact both on the consumer surplus and the
profits and should be therefore considered in any such policy evaluation.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of proposition 1
Proof. In each case, I directly verify the claim:
1. Linear demand is a special case of power demand with d = β = 1.
2. Power demand implies g(P ) = − d(a−bP )
1
β
d 1
β
(a−bP )
1
β
−1(−b)
= β(P − P ), where P = a
b
. Then
−g′(P ) = β > 0 and (−1)k dkg(P )
dPk
= 0, for all k > 1.
3. Logit demand implies g(P ) = 1
α
[
1 + e−αP
]
. Then (−1)k dkg(P )
dPk
= αk−1e−αP > 0.
4. Exponential demand implies g(P ) = 1
α
[
Pe−αP − 1
]
. Therefore (−1)k dkg(P )
dPk
=
αk−1Pe−αP > 0.
A.2 Proof of theorem 1
Before the proof, let me introduce some useful notation. Each player i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n},
observes prices of some players. Let the set of these players be Oi = {j : aji = 1} ⊂ N
(possibly empty set) and vector of these prices pi = (pj)j∈Oi . Player i’s strategy is p∗i (pi).
Player i also influences some players, let the set of these players be Ii = {j : aij = 1} ⊂ N
(again, possibly empty). Each such player j ∈ Ii uses the equilibrium strategy p∗j(pj). By
definition, i ∈ Oj, i.e. pi is one of the inputs in pj. However, i does not necessarily observe
all prices in pj, therefore it must make an equilibrium conjecture about these values. Let
pij(pi,pi) denote player j’s action as seen by player i. That is, pij(pi,pi) = p∗j(p′j), where
pj = (p′k)k∈Oj is such that p′k = pk if k ∈ Oi or k = i and p′k = pik(pi,pi) otherwise. The last
step makes the definition recursive, but it is well-defined, as each such step strictly reduces
the number of arguments in the function. Finally, there are also some players whose prices
that i neither observes nor influences, let this set be Uj = {j : aji = aij = 0} ⊂ N . For
these players, i expects the actions to be pij(pi) defined in the same way as above, but its
arguments do not include pi.
Using this notation, a firm i that observes pi and sets its price to pi, expects the price
of the final good to be
P i(pi|pi) = c0 + pi +
∑
j∈Oi
pj +
∑
j∈Ii
pij(pi,pi) +
∑
j∈Ui
pij(pi). (22)
The main idea in the proof is the following. Instead of choosing price pi to maximize
profit (pi − ci)D(P i(pi|pi)), we can think of player i choosing the final good price P
to induce. For this, let me assume that in the relevant range, P i(pi|pi) is smooth and
strictly increasing in pi, so that it has a differentiable and strictly increasing inverse
function fi(P |pi) such that P i(fi(P |pi)|pi) = P . Then the maximization problem is
max
P
[fi(P |pi)− ci]D(P ),
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which leads to first-order condition f ′i(P |pi)D(P )+[fi(P |pi)−ci]D′(P ) = 0 or equivalently
fi(P |pi)− ci = g(P )f ′i(P |pi). (23)
Note that there is one-to-one mapping between representing equilibrium behavior in terms
of functions fi(P |pi) and in terms of p∗i (pi).
Proof. Observe that the equilibrium must be interior, i.e. each ci < pi < P for each firm.
If this is not the case for the firm i, then its equilibrium profit is non-positive. This could
be for one of two reasons. First, the equilibrium price of the final good is so high that
D(P ) = 0. In this case, all equilibrium profits are non-positive and there must be at least
one firm i who, by reducing its price (and anticipating the responses of firms influenced),
can make the final good price low enough so that it ensures a strictly positive profit. This
would be a profitable deviation. Second, if P < P and pi ≤ ci, then firm i can raise its
price slightly and increase its profit.
I will first derive necessary conditions for an interior equilibrium and combine them
into one necessary condition, which gives equation (9). I then show that it has a unique
solution and finally verify that it is indeed an equilibrium by verifying that each firm
indeed chooses a price that maximizes its profit.
Let us start with any player i who does influence any other players, i.e. e′iA1 = 0 or
equivalently Ii = ∅. Then we can rewrite equation (22) as
P = c0 + fi(P |pi) +
∑
j∈Oi
pj +
∑
j∈Ui
pij(pi). (24)
Differentiating this expression with respect to P shows that f ′i(P |pi) = 1 (that is, player
i can raise the price of the final good by ε by raising its own price by ε). Therefore
equation (23) implies fi(P |pi) = ci + g(P ). Note that this expression is independent of
pi, so I can drop it as an argument for fi and write simply as fi(P ) = ci + g(P ).
Let us take now any player i and suppose that the optimal behavior of all players
j ∈ Ii is described corresponding functions fj(P ) that do not depend on the remaining
arguments pj. Then we can rewrite equation (22) as
P = c0 + fi(P |pi) +
∑
j∈Oi
pj +
∑
j∈Ii
fj(P ) +
∑
j∈Ui
pij(pi). (25)
Differentiating this expression and inserting it to equation (23) gives
f ′i(P |pi) = 1−
∑
j∈Ii
f ′j(P ) ⇒ fi(P |pi) = g(P )
1−∑
j∈Ii
f ′j(P )
 . (26)
This expression is again independent of the arguments pi, which we can therefore drop.
Moreover, these arguments give precise analytic expressions for fi(P ) functions. We
already saw that fi(P ) = g(P ) =
∑n
k=1 e
′
iA
k−11gk(P ) when e′iAk−11 = 0 for all k > 1
(i.e. players who do not influence anybody). Suppose that every player j ∈ Ii has
fj(P )− cj =
n∑
k=1
e′jA
k−11gk(P ). (27)
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Then for player i we must have
fi(P )− ci = g(P )
1−∑
j∈Ii
f ′j(P )
 = g(P )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=e′iA
01g1(P )
+
n∑
k=1
∑
j∈Ii
e′jA
k−11
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=e′iA
k1
[−g′k(P )g(P )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
gk+1(P )
, (28)
which, after change of variables from k to k− 1 and combining the terms, gives the same
expression as in equation (27).18
Therefore on-path, when the equilibrium price of the final good is P ∗, the individual
prices are indeed given by the expressions in the theorem. The price of the final good
must be sum all input prices, therefore P ∗ must satisfy
P ∗ = c0 +
∑
i∈N
fi(P ∗) = c0 +
∑
i∈N
cj︸ ︷︷ ︸
=C
+
n∑
k=1
∑
i∈N
e′iA
k−11︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1′Ak−11
gk(P ∗),
which gives the equation (9).
Below I prove two technical lemmas (lemmas 2 and 3) provide monotonicity properties
that imply existence and uniqueness of equilibria. We can rewrite equation (9) as f(P ) =
P −C−∑nk=1 1′Ak−11gk(P ) = 0. At P = 0 we have f(0) = −C−∑nk=1 1′Ak−11gk(0) < 0
and limP→P f(P ) > 0. By lemma 3, function f(P ) is strictly increasing and therefore
f(P ) = 0 has a unique solution, which is the equilibrium price of the final good P ∗ ∈
(0, P ).
Next, in the argument above, we assumed that the inverse function of fi(P ) function is
strictly increasing. The construction implied a necessary condition that fi(P ) must satisfy
and lemma 3 shows that it implies that fi(P ) is indeed strictly increasing, therefore the
inverse function P i(pi|pi) is indeed a well-defined strictly increasing function. Finally, to
verify that the solution we found is indeed an equilibrium, we need to verify that the
solution we derived is indeed a global maximizer for each firm. Notice that by lemma 3,
the optimality condition equation (23) has a unique solution for each firm. Therefore
we have identified a unique local optimum for each firm. As we already verified that
corner solutions would give non-positive profits for each firm and the interior solution
gives strictly positive profit, this must be a global maximizer.
Lemma 2 (Monotonicity of gk(P )). gk(P ) is (d(A) + 1− k)-times monotone.
Proof. g1(P ) = g(P ) = − D(P )D′(P ) is d(A)-times monotone by assumption 3. Therefore g′(P )
is (d(A) − 1)-times and g2(P ) = −g′1(P )g(P ) is (d(A) − 1)-times monotone. The rest
follows by induction in the same way, if gk(P ) is (d(A) + 1 − k)-times monotone, then
gk+1(P ) = −g′k(P )g(P ) is (d(A)− k)-times monotone.
Lemma 3 (Monotonicity of f(P ), fi(P )). The following monotonicity properties hold
1. f(P ) = P − C −∑nk=1 1′Ak−11gk(P ) is strictly increasing,
2. fi(P ) = ci −∑nk=1 e′iAk−11gk(P ) is strictly increasing for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
18Note that no player can have level-n influences, i.e. e′iAn1 = 0.
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3. f ′i(P )g(P ) =
∑n
k=1 e
′
iA
k−11gk(P ) is (weakly) decreasing for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Proof. Each 1′Ak−11 and e′iAk−11 is a non-negative integer and each gk(P ) weakly de-
creasing in −P by lemma 2, which implies weak monotonicity of f ′i(P )g(P ). More-
over, when k = 1, then g1(P ) = g(P ) which is strictly decreasing by assumption 3 and
e′iA
k−11 = 1 > 0, which implies that fi(P ) is strictly increasing. As P − C is strictly
increasing, then f(P ) is also strictly increasing.
A.3 Proof of lemma 1
Proof. Using the facts that g(P ) = 1
α
[
1 + e−αP
]
> 1
α
and gk(P ) > 0 for all k > 0,
equation (9) gives P ∗ = C +∑nk=1 1′Ak−11gk(P ∗) > C + ng(P ∗) > C + nα . Similarly for
individual prices, p∗i = ci +
∑n
k=1 e
′
iA
k−11gk(P ∗) > ci + g(P ∗) > ci + 1α .
Using the lower bound for P ∗, we can bound e−αP ∗ < e−αC−αnα = e−αCe−n. Therefore
e−αP
∗ = O(e−n). I use this result to prove lemma 4 that shows that g1(P ∗) = 1α +O(e
−n)
and gk(P ∗) = O(e−n) for all k > 1. Therefore equation (9) gives
P ∗ = C +
n∑
k=1
1′Ak−11gk(P ∗) = C +
n
α
+O(e−n)B(A), (29)
where B(A) = ∑nk=1 1′Ak−11. Now, note that B(A) increases each time an edge is
added to A, so its upper bound is when the network is most connected (fully sequential
decisions) and lower bound with least connected network (simultaneous decisions), so that
n ≤ B(A) ≤ 2n − 1. Therefore B(A) = O(2n). Inserting this observation to previous
expression gives P ∗ = C + n
α
+ O
([
2
e
]n)
. Finally, for the equilibrium expression for
individual prices is
p∗i = ci +
n∑
k=1
e′iA
k−11gk(P ∗) = ci +
1
α
+O(e−n)Bi(A), (30)
where Bi(A) =
∑n
k=1 e
′
iA
k−11, which is by the same arguments as above Bk(A) = O(2n)
and therefore pi = ci + 1α +O
([
2
e
]n)
.
Lemma 4. With logit demand D(P ) = d e−α1+e−αP , functions gk(P ) and their derivatives
have the following limit properties at P = P ∗
1. g1(P ∗) = 1α +O(e
−n) = O(1), gk(P ∗) = O(e−n) for all k ∈ {2, . . . , n},
2. dlgk(P ∗)
dP l
= O(e−n) for all k, l ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Proof. Consider g1(P ) first. We get g1(P ∗) = g(P ∗) = 1α +
1
α
e−αP
∗ = 1
α
+O(e−n) = O(1).
The derivatives dlg1(P ∗)
dP l
= (−α)k−1e−αP ∗ = O(e−n). The rest of the proof is by induction.
Suppose that the claim holds for g1, . . . , gk. Now, gk+1(P ∗) = −g′k(P ∗)g(P ∗) = O(e−n) as
g(P ∗) = O(1) and g′k(P ∗) = O(e−n) by induction assumption. Each derivative
dlgk+1(P ∗)
dP l
= −
l∑
j=0
(
l
j
)
g
(l−j+1)
k (P ∗)g(j)(P ∗) (31)
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Each g(l−j+1)k (P ∗) = O(e−n) by induction assumption (as l−j+1 ≥ 1). When j = 0, then
g(j)(P ∗) = g(P ∗) = O(1). Therefore the first element of the sum is g(l−j+1)k (P ∗)g(j)(P ∗) =
O(e−n). For all other elements j > 0, so the term g(j)(P ∗) = O(e−n) and therefore
each g(l−j+1)k (P ∗)g(j)(P ∗) = O(e−2n), which is dominated asymptotically by O(e−n). This
proves that d
lgk+1(P ∗)
dP l
= O(e−n).
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